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Preferential Relief in Employment
Discrimination Cases
MARTIN SLATE*
In enforcement cases brought under the federal fair employment
laws, the courts are often asked to order precentage preferential
relief. Mr. Slate, an EEOC attorney, examines the approach taken
by the courts toward such "reverse discrimination" and considers
it to be a principled one. The courts, he says, have issued preferential orders only when more moderate forms of relief will not
remedy the discrimination. Thus, relief has been ordered when
the specific victims of past discrimination cannot be identified,
when the presence of minority persons in the work force is likely
to generate a representative number of minority applications, or
when the evidence indicates that the employer will refuse to honor
a more moderate order. Mr. Slate concludes that this approach is
consistent with general remedial principles. Nevertheless, he
explains, because the courts have found the arguments against
percentage relief troublesome, they have tailored their orders in
ways which minimize the force of the objections and conflict of
values implicit in them.

In one fair employment case after another, the courts are ordering
employers and unions to remedy unlawful discriminatory hiring practices by allocating a specific number of positions to qualified minority
applicants. Such orders of preferential relief have generated substantial controversy. Critics contend that judicially contrived preferential
hiring constitutes "discrimination in reverse," legally equivalent to the
unlawful conduct originally condemned, and that preferential relief is
therefore impermissible. Advocates of the affirmative -relief reply that
a preferential order does not call for discrimination or saddle a respon* LL.B., Yale Law School (1970); A.B., Harvard College (1967). Mr. Slate formerly worked with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and is currently an appellate attorney with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington,

D.C.
The views expressed in the article are those of the author; they do not reflect in
any way the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other

government agency.

The author wishes to thank Caroline Poplin of the Yale Law
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dent with rigid numerical requirements or minority quotas but merely
asks him to make a good faith effort to reach a certain goal for minority participation. Authorities have correctly noted, however, that such
explanations neither provide a principled justification for preferential
relief nor squarely meet the claims of reverse discrimination. For example, as the trial judge in Bridgeport Guardians,Inc. v. Commission'
explained:
Ultimately the distinction [between quota hiring to remedy discrimination and affirmative action toward a goal] becomes illusory.
As the -time nears to reach the [court ordered] goal, a member of the
. . . group [discriminated against] must be hired in preference
to a majority group person as is required to meet the goal. A
quota, for all its unhappy connotations, is simply a recognition of
the reality encountered in reaching the desired goal.
This article examines the judicial approach taken toward preferential relief in cases brought under the federal fair employment laws.2
Study of the cases reveals that the courts have taken a principled
approach to preferential relief. They have issued preferential orders
only in well-defined circumstances. Court opinions have not directly
addressed the criticisms of preferential relief, 'but most judges have
tailored their orders to minimize the force of the criticisms.
Fair employment remedies have a dual purpose: they seek to undo
the effect of past discrimination and to assure equal opportunity in
the future.3 In the usual case a court will order monetary compensation and perhaps employment for the individual victims, seeking to
undo the effects of past discrimination. 4 The court will also enjoin
the discriminatory practice, thereby assuring equal opportunity in the
future.5 However, in some circumstances this simple remedy will not
work. In some of the more complex cases the courts have turned
to preferential relief.
The device of preferential relief enables the courts to meet their
Without
obligation to eliminate discrimination "root and branch."
such relief, certain types of discrimination-such as deterrence of unidentified minority applicants before they even apply for jobs-would
1. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n,
354 F. Supp. 778, 798, 5 F.E.P. 570, 585 (D. Conn.), aff'd in part, 482 F.2d 1333,
5 F.E.P. 1344 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1970),
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970),

as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, Pub.
L. No.
3.
4.
5.

6.
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92-261 (March 24, 1972).
See Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id.
See, e.g., id.; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).

Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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go unremedied. Nevertheless, the objections to preferential reliefespecially the "reverse discrimination" claim-have substantial force.
Consequently, even when faced with the proposition that only preferential relief will remedy discrimination, the courts are reluctant to
issue preferential orders in the absence of additional compelling circumstances; and where preferential orders are issued, the courts tailor
them so as to minimize the force of possible objections.
The first section of this article reviews the authority and precedent
for preferential relief. The second section discusses theoretical bases
for the relief. The third discusses objections and policies against it.
The final section of the article demonstrates how the courts try in practice -to reconcile the conflict of values implicit in a preferential order.
AUTHORITY AND PRECEDENT FOR PREFERENTIAL RELIEF

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 7 guarantees the right of equal
employment opportunity to workers in both the private and public sectors. Section 703(a) of the Act makes it an "unlawful employment
practice" for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
effect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Similarly, section 703 (c) prohibits a union from discriminating
against its members or applicants for membership. Section 706(g)
authorizes a court to order "such affirmative action" or provide "any
. . . equitable relief as . . . [it] deems appropriate" to remedy a violation of section 703. Pursuant to section 706(g), the courts have frequently ordered respondents to remedy unlawful employment practices by engaging in preferential hiring or referral for a specified pe7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
For more discussion of the history of Title VII, see generally BNA, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNTrrY ACT OF 1972 14-54 (1973).
The courts have applied the
same remedial principles in Civil Rights Act cases as they have in Title VII cases. See
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329, 4 F.E.P. 121, 123 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). Title VII, as amended in sections 701 and 706(f)(1),
prohibits discrimination in public employment as well as private, 42 U.S.C. H9 2000e,
2000e-5(f) (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974).
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Preferential orders have been

issued in cases involving 'both private8 and public' employers and re8. United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 5 F.E.P. 823 (8th Cir.
1973) (Title VII case ordering that the next thirty promotions to foreman be made
on a one-to-one basis, but denying Government's request for preferential hiring of clerical personnel); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. (I), 325 F. Supp. 478, 3
F.E.P. 354 (W.D. N.C. 1970) (Title VII case granting preliminary injunction requiring
trucking company to hire six blacks as over-the-road drivers and to make any additional
over-the-road hires on a one-for-one basis); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.
(II), 338 F. Supp. 532, 4 F.E.P. 216 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (Title VII case ordering onefor-one hiring ratio until the percentage of blacks in designated positions reaches 20%);
Buckner v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108, 4 F.E.P. 648 (N.D.
Ala. 1972), alf'd, 476 F.2d 1287, 5 F.E.P. 1165 (5th Cir. 1973) (Title VII case ordering company to provide pre-apprenticeship training for twenty blacks per year and to
admit blacks to its apprenticeship program on a one-to-one basis until the percentage
of black apprentices equals three-fourths of the percentage of blacks in the company's
production department); United States v. United States Steel Corp., - F. Supp. -,
5 F.E.P. 1253 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (Title VII case incorporating steel plant's affirmative
action program into decree calling for 28% minority representation in certain departments); Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 6 F.E.P. 612 (E.D. Mich.),
and - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (Title VII case ordering preferential hiring and promotion at electric company); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz, 442 F.2d 159, 3 F.E.P. 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971) (Title VII case upholding the legality of the Philadelphia Plan which required
bidders for federal construction contracts to meet goals for minority hiring); Southern
Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 5 F.E.P. 229 (7th Cir. 1972) (Title
VII case upholding Ogilvie Plan which required preferential placement and training of
minority workers in the highway construction industry); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F.
Supp. 1284, 3 F.E.P. 111 (D.N.J. 1970) (Title VII case upholding the New Jersey Plan
for bidders on federal construction contracts).
For challenges by employers and unions to the validity of executive orders or action
see Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 2 F.E.P. 1024 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 944 (1971); Associated General Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 6 F.E.P.
1013 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, -U.S. (1974) (Title VH case holding that a
preferential requirement in state construction contract is lawful), and the Ogilvie and
Joyce cases cited above.
9. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 4 F.E.P. 121 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (civil rights case ordering Minneapolis Fire Department
to include twenty minorities among its next sixty hires, modifying district court order
that the department fill its next twenty openings with minority persons); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 F.E.P. 713 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (civil rights
case affirming order that the Philadelphia Police Department make one of three hires
minority hires until the department validates its hiring examination). The en banc
panel decisions in the Carter and O'Neill cases cited above overruled prior preferential
orders. More public employment cases are Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 4 F.E.P.
700 (1st Cir. 1972), - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 943 (D. Mass. 1973) (on remand) (civil
rights case ordering Boston Police Department to place minority applicants who had
failed discriminatory examination in priority pool if they pass valid examination and
to draw a certain ratio of its new hires from the pool); Baker v. Columbus Municipal
Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 4 F.E.P. 921 (5th Cir. 1972) (civil rights case
ordering school district to hire as many qualified black teachers for 1972-73 as may
be necessary to reach its 1969-70 black/white ratio); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 4 F.E.P. 864 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service, 482 F.2d 1333, 5 F.E.P.
1344 (2d Cir. 1973) (civil rights case upholding district court decree that Bridgeport
Police Department hire on a preferential basis until 15% of force is black and Puerto
Rican, but reversing the lower court's order for preferential promotions); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sebastian, - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 499 (W.D. Pa.), alf'd,
480 F.2d 917, 6 F.E.P. 1122 (3d Cir. 1973) (civil rights case affirming preliminary
order for Penn Mills Police Department to include one black among its next six hires);
Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New York,
F.2d -,
6 F.E.R. 1045, 6 E.P.D.
8974 (2d Cir. 1973) (cvil rights case affirming interim order requiring New York Fire Department to hire on a three-to-one
basis until nondiscriminating testing procedures are developed); United States v. Frazer,
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ferral labor unions10 who have practiced discrimination.

Some orders

317 F. Supp. 1079, 2 F.E.P. 847 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (civil rights case ordering appointments to the Alabama state employment service in the ratio of the black to white population); N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 4 F.E.P. 605 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (civil
rights case ordering 50/50 hiring ratio until 25% of the Alabama State Police force is
black); Strain v. Philpott, 331 F. Supp. 836, 3 F.E.P. 922 (M.D. Ala.) and -F. Supp.
-,
4 F.E.P. 822 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (civil rights case ordering state agency to fill 50%
of its staff and secretarial openings with qualified blacks until a population parity is
reached); Coffey v. Brady, - F. Supp. -, - F.E.P. - (M.D. Fla. 1971) (No. 7144) (civil rights case ordering hiring of firemen on a one-to-one basis until the ratio
of black to white firemen equals the black to white population ratio in Jacksonville);
Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 566 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(civil rights case ordering Cleveland Police Department to make 18% of its hires minority hires until its entrance test is validated); Arnold v. Ballard, - F. Supp. -, 6
F.E.P. 287 (N.D. Ohio), and F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 899 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (Title
VII interim order requiring one-to-one hiring ratio in Akron Police Department pending outcome of suit); Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 360 F.
Supp. 733, 6 F.E.P. 85 (N.D. Cal.), and - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1270 (N.D. Cal.
1973) (civil rights preliminary order requiring San Francisco Fire Department to fill
vacancies on a one-to-one basis); Davis v. City of Los Angeles, - F. Supp. -,
F.E.P. - (S.D. Cal. 1973) (No. 73-63) (civil rights case ordering Los Angeles Fire
Department to hire 40% minorities until the population parity is remedied); N.A.A.C.P.
v. Civil Service Comm'n of San Francisco, - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1285, 6 E.P.D.
8956 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (Title VII preliminary order requiring San Francisco Police
Department to hire 60% minorities until 30% of force is composed of minorities and
to promote to sergeant on one-to-one basis until sergeants are 30% minority persons);
Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 357 F. Supp. 422, 6 F.E.P. 18 (W.D. Pa.)
and 360 F. Supp. 628, 6 F.E.P. 733 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (preliminary order under the
Civil Rights Act requiring police department to place ten blacks in twenty openings).
See also Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 2 F.E.P. 1024 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 944 (1971) (Title VII case authorizing school board to include race as a factor in the selection of principals and vice-principals); Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (I), - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 1049 (D. Md. 1973) (civil rights interim
order that Baltimore Fire Department hire on a 25% to 30% minority basis until trial);
Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (II), 359 F. Supp. 1187, 5 F.E.P. 1050
(D. Md.), modified and a/I'd sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 6 F.E.P.
880 (4th Cir. 1973) (civil rights order denying permanent preferential relief but ordering fire department to accept applicants from the Baltimore area only (population 47%
black) rather than from the entire urban area (population 24% black)). But see Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960, 5 F.E.P. 934 (5th Cir. 1973), afI'd and remanded, 491
F.2d 1053, 7 F.E.P. 586 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (civil rights case upholding the
district court's denial of preferential relief to remedy discrimination in the Mississippi
Highway Patrol); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportaton Authority, 306 F.
Supp. 1355, 2 F.E.P. 371 (D. Mass. 1969) (civil rights case denying preferential hiring
for subway system); Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 6 F.E.P. 493
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (Title VII case denying preferential hiring of minorities and women
on the East Cleveland Police Force); Anderson v. San Francisco School Dist., 357 F.
Supp. 248, 5 F.E.P. 362 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Title VII case invalidating preferential promotion plan adopted by the San Francisco schools which virtually would have precluded whites from holding administrative positions).
In Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 396 U.S. 290 (1970), a civil rights case, the court held
that if a school district dismisses or demotes staff pursuant to an integration program,
it may not fill any vacancy with a person of a race different from the race of the
person displaced until each displaced staff member who is qualified has an opportunity
to fill the vacancy and has failed to accept an offer to do so. The Supreme Court
has regularly upheld school desegregation orders requiring school districts to assign a
certain percentage of black teachers to each school. See United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235 (1969); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19 (1971).
These programs are designed to facilitate integration of teachers to conform better with the racial make-up of the student bodies; they
are not strictly remedial in the same sense as is preferential employment discrimination
relief.
10. Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v.
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have required such respondent employers to hire, or unions to refer,
a fixed number" or a fixed percentage"2 of minority members; and
others have required respondents to reach a certain percentage of minority participation in the relevant work force over a specified period
of time.'" Some orders have required preferential treatment for one
round of hires; and others have extended the order up to five years."

In passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,15 turning back an amendment that would have made preferential relief un-

lawful, Congress reaffirmed the authority of the judiciary to order such
relief.' 6

The courts have made it clear, however, that preferential

Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1 F.E.P. 577 (5th Cir. 1969), Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451
F.2d 1236, 4 F.E.P. 12 (5th Cir. 1971) (Title VII case affirming and continuing indefinitely a one-for-one order requiring alternating black and white referrals); United
States v. Wood Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l U., Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 5 F.E.P. 318
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (Title VII case ordering union to issue
one hundred permits to non-whites and then to issue permits on a one-to-one basis until
1975); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 5 F.E.P. 478 (6th Cir. 1973)
(Title VII case ordering union to build its minority membership up to 11% by drawing
trainees from federal training programs for minorities); United States v. Ironworkers,
Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 2 F.E.P. 741 (W.D. Wash. 1970), ajf'd, 443 F.2d 544,
3 F.E.P. 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (Title VII order requiring
30% black participation in apprenticeship training classes); United States v. Operating
Engineers, Local 520, 476 F.2d 1201, 5 F.E.P. 971 (7th Cir. 1973) (Title VII case
suggesting that district court develop a new consent decree with preferential provisions
in light of the original decree's failure to provide opportunities for minorities); United
States v. Local 10 Sheet Metal Workers, - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1036, 3 E.P.D.
8068 (D.N.J. 1973) (Title VII case ordering inclusion of "seasonal help" in three-tofive referral ratio); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 10, - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P.
59 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (Title VII case ordering the union to indenture twenty-one minority group apprentices on a yearly basis until 1977 or to reach a goal of minority
participation before 1977); United States v. Plumbers, Local 24, 364 F. Supp. 808, 6
F.E.P. 385 (D.N.J. 1973) (Title VII case ordering plumbers' referral union to develop
a program to achieve parity between minority and white plumbers); United States v.
Steamfitters, Local 638, 360 F. Supp. 979, 6 F.E.P. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Title VII
case ordering referral union, contractors and joint apprenticeship committee to develop
an affirmative action program to assure 30% minority journeymen by 1977); Sims v.
Sheet Metal Workers, Local 65, 353 F. Supp. 22, 5 F.E.P. 557 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd
in part, - F.2d -, 6 F.E.P. 1141 (6th Cir. 1973) (Title VII case ordering union to
indenture applicants for its apprenticeship program on a 50/50 basis until one-third of
the apprentices are black); E.E.O.C. v. Plumbers, Local 189, - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P.
133 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (on remand) (Title VII case ordering union which had committed a section 706(i) violation to modify its experience requirements where applicable to blacks and to refer blacks to certain jobs on a one-to-one ratio with whites);
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 2 F.E.P.
127 (8th Cir. 1969) (Title VII case ordering union to modify its referral experience
requirement for blacks who are otherwise qualified).
11. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 4 F.E.P. 121 (8th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
12. E.g., Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 566 (N.D.
Ohio 1972).
13. E.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 5 F.E.P. 1344 (2d Cir. 1973); N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703, 4 F.E.P. 605 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
14. E.g., compare Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sebastian, 480 F.2d 917, 6
F.E.P. 1122 (3d Cir. 1973) with United States v. Ironworkers, Local 10, - F. Supp.
-, 6 F.E.P. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
15. 86 Stat. 103, Pub. L. No. 92-261 (March 24, 1972).
16. Amendment No. 829 to S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), proposed by Senators Ervin (D.-N.C.) and Allen (D.-La.) would have provided that:
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relief is appropriate only in special circumstances. 17 The following
section seeks to identify those circumstances and the accompanying
rationale for relief.
THEORIES IN SUPPORT OF PREFERENTIAL RELIEF

Relief as Pragmatism
At first blush it may appear that the courts have issued preferential

orders less out of principle than out of the need for a pragmatic solution to an immediate, perplexing lawsuit or in reaction to especially
flagrant behavior. Many Title VII cases are complex. Frequently
the courts are called upon to pass on the legality of various sophisticated or subtle hiring techniques, to define the class affected by such
techniques in circumstances making the evidence of discrimination
anything but clear, and to develop a remedy which balances the respective rights of minorities, non-minorities, and respondents. When
all the evidence is before the court it may be clear that discrimination
is present, but it may not be so clear how to structure judicial relief
that will undo the discrimination. Specifically, the evidence may show
that the particular employer's job standards--experience requirements, tests, educational requirements, interviews, etc.--collectively
are denying opportunities to minority persons; but the evidence may
not show which procedures should be modified, which should be eliminated, or how the court can practicably administer the relief scheme.
In these difficult circumstances the court may find it more practical
and equitable to require percentage or numerical hiring. As the
Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals has stated:
[W]e believe that "numerical objectives may be the only feasible
mechanism for defining with any clarity the obligation of . . .
[employers] to move employment practices in the direction of true
8
neutrality."

1

No department, agency, or officer of the United States shall require any
employer to practice discrimination in reverse by employing persons of a particular race, or a particular religion, or a particular national origin, or a particular sex in either fixed or variable numbers, proportions, percentages,
quotas, goals, or ranges. Any officer of the United States or any other person
who violates this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year and fined not exceeding
$1,000.
See UNITED STATES G.P.O., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, 1017, 1042-75 (1972).
The amendment was rejected by a vote
of 44 to 22 after lengthy debate. 118 CONG. REC. 696-703 (1972). See also United
States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 636, 5 F.E.P. 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973).
17. See, e.g., United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 2 F.E.P. 716 (6th
Cir,), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
18. Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 686, 5 F.E.P. 229,
234 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Similarly, the need for speed may dictate preferential relief. For
example, in Shield Club v. City of Cleveland," a federal district court
found the testing requirements of the Cleveland police department
suspect. Rather than wait for -the department to validate its test with
technical evidence, the court ordered the department to fill 188 openings on a preferential basis. The court explained that it had considered "holding up" appointments to the force until validation studies were
completed, but that the "urgent need" to fill the openings, to maintain the public safety and to retain federal funding for the positions,
necessitated preferential relief.2 0 Likewise, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Civil
Service Commission of San Francisco,2' the court issued a preliminary
injunction calling for preferential hiring and promotion in the San
Francisco fire department because "refusing the injunction would
. . . deny plaintiffs and others like them any real opportunity for appointment until a final decision on the merits," by which time many
positions might have been filled. 2
Relief as a Justifiable Reaction to the Respondent's Extreme Behavior
or Exclusion of Minorities
In many cases which have ended in preferential relief, the respondent's behavior has been particularly flagrant. In United States v.
Lathers, Local 46,2 for example, a New York referral union which
had virtually excluded minorities from membership signed a consent
decree requiring it to institute nondiscriminatory referral procedures. "4 The union delayed so long in developing the court ordered
procedures that it was cited for contempt of court for violation of the
decree. The contempt ruling notwithstanding, the union continued to
decrease the number of non-white referrals. Finally, the court imposed a stiff preferential order, citing the union's "course of passive
resistance and inaction" and its "unlawful and contumacious practices." -5 In these extreme circumstances, and in others like them,
preferential orders seem to result from the courts' exasperation rather
than from a well-thought-out judicial theory. In a very general sense,
therefore, the orders are punitive.
19.
20.
21.

-

22.
23.

Id. at -, 6 F.E.P. at 1296, 6 E.P.D. 8956 at 6071.
United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers, Int'l Union, Local 46, 471

F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 566 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
5 F.E.P. at 568.
F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1285, 6 E.P.D. 8956 (N.D. Cal. 1973).

Id. at -,
-

F.2d 408, 5 F.E.P. 318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
24. See full discussion by the district court at 328 F. Supp. 429, 3 F.E.P. 457
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).

25.
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In spite of the stop-gap nature of the cases discussed above, there
exist nevertheless more substantive, theoretical foundations to preferrential relief which grow out of general remedial principles. If the
courts have been at fault, their fault has not been in -issuing such preferential orders. Rather, their fault has been in sometimes failing to
articulate the rationale behind the particular orders, thereby leaving
the impression that -they are issued simply for pragmatic or punitive
purposes.
Substantive Theories for Relief
Title VII remedies generally perform two functions: they seek to
compensate the victims of past discrimination and to assure equal employment opportunity in the future. Preferential relief achieves those
purposes in circumstances where more moderate forms of relief will
be ineffective. For example, the courts order preferential relief to
compensate for past discrimination when the victims of the discrimination cannot be identified; or to assure future equal opportunity when
it is clear that simply ordering an employer to eliminate unlawful hiring practices will not encourage minority group members to seek positions with that employer; or when the evidence establishes that an
employer will not comply with a prior, more moderate order. These
three situations frequently overlap, occurring sometimes in identical
fact patterns, but the doctrinal approach in each situation is unique.
Compensation for Past Unlawful Practices When the Victims Cannot
Be Named
Unlawful hiring or referral practices fall into three patterns: (i) the
respondent hires a sufficient number of minority workers overall but
assigns them only to lower-paying jobs; 26 (ii) the respondent does not
hire a sufficient number of minorities, but, perhaps because he has
made some efforts to comply with Title VII, minorities have applied
for positions in reasonable numbers; 27 or (iii) the respondent has not
opened his doors to minorities and, as a result, he has discouraged
minorities from applying for positions in his work force.2 8 The
26. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 3 F.E.P. 589
(2d Cir. 1971).
27. See, e.g., Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., F. Supp. -,
4 F.E.P. 561
(E.D.N.C. 1971).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 132,
2 F.E.P. 127, 134 (8th Cir. 1969); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330, 4 F.E.P.
121, 124 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Central Motor
Lines, Inc. (II), 338 F. Supp. 532, 551, 4 F.E.P. 216, 232 (W.D.N.C. 1970); United
States v. Local 86, Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1234, 2 F.E.P. 741, 770 (W.D.
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remedy for past practices in the first two situations is relatively
straightforward. Since the individual victims can be identified (in
case (i), they are the minority persons laboring in the lower-paying
positions, and in case (ii), they are the black applicants who were
discriminatorily rejected by the respondents) the respondent can make
up for his past practices by placing the victims in those positions they
would have held but for the discrimination, and by awarding them
back pay.29
This approach, however, will not undo the effects of past discrimination in case (iii) because individual victims remain unidentified. A
court can order the employer to discontinue his discriminatory hiring
practices and thereby assure future compliance with the civil rights
laws, but the court cannot remedy the effects of past practices by
awarding jobs to designated victims. Because of the respondent's exclusionary practices, no member of the affected class has dared or
wished to apply; hence, the individual victims of the respondent's practices cannot be identified. In these circumstances where, because of
the respondents conduct the victims of discrimination cannot be
named, 30 the courts seek to undo the effects of discrimination by
awarding jobs to the minority work force as a whole 'through a program of preferential relief. The discrimination had the effect of injuring the minority work force as a whole, and the injury can be undone by providing relief to any member or members of that work
force. 3 ' The respondent's violation was not his refusal actually to hire
particular individuals (since he never reached that stage) but rather
the deterrent effect of his policies upon victimized minority members.
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36,32 a case involving
discrimination by three referral unions, provides an example of this
broad approach. Minority leaders testified in that case that the exclusionary policies of the respondent unions were well known. Minority
craftsmen testified that they never sought to make use of the unions'
referral services because of their exclusionary reputation. Some miWash. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 544, 3 F.E.P. 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n,
354 F. Supp. 778, 786-87, 5 F.E.P. 570, 576 (D. Conn.), a/I'd, 482 F.2d 1333, 5 F.E.P.
1344 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. Although back pay money judgments can amount to considerable expense when
assessed against a respondent, the personal expense of discrimination to the victims and
the social expense to the community justify the remedy.
30. See United States v. Local 86, Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1235, 2 F.E.P.
741, 770 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
31. See United States v. Central Motor Lines (II), 338 F. Supp. 532, 560, 4 F.E.P.
216, 240 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
32. 416 F.2d 123, 2 F.E.P. 127 (8th Cir. 1969).
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nority witnesses even stated that they had directed their careers away
from the sheet metal trade in light of the unions' longstanding discriminatory policy. 33 The court justified its grant of preferential relief
by pointing out the deterrent effect of the unions' referral policies:
The record . . . show[s] that qualified Negro tradesmen have been
and continue to be residents of the area. It further shows that they
were acutely aware of the Locals' policies toward minority groups.
It is also clear that they knew that even if they were permitted
to use the referral system and become members of the union, they
would have to work for at least a year before they could move
into a priority group which would assure them reasonably full employment. In the light of this knowledge, it is unreasonable to
expect that any Negro tradesmen working for a Negro contractor
or a nonconstruction white employer would seek to use the referral
systems or to join [the locals] . . .34
In cases presenting this sort of deterrent situation the respondent
is in no position to resist preferential relief on the ground that the
beneficiaries of the relief are as yet unnamed. It is precisely because
of the respondent's across-the-board deterrence that the victims of discrimination cannot be individually identified.
Undoing Continuing Effects of Discrimination and Providing for Future Self-GeneratingMinority Employment
Title VII remedies can also be designed to assure increased minority
opportunities in the future. Generally, the elimination of a discriminatory job requirement, such as a non-job-related employment test that
rejects blacks at a higher rate than whites, will have the effect of providing new opportunities and employment for minority workers. Opening a respondent's doors in this way, however, will not result in minor33. The type of testimony presented in United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local
36, 416 F.2d 123, 2 F.E.P. 127 (8th Cir. 1969), is the most effective means for proving
that the respondent has deterred minority applicants. Other factors which have persuaded the courts to find deterrent practices include a disproportionately low percentage
of black applicants, evidence that information pertaining to employment was withheld
from prospective minority applicants, and evidence that those who did apply were
treated unequally or discourteously. See United States v. Local 86, Ironworkers, 315
F. Supp. 1202, 1207-10, 2 F.E.P. 741, 747-49 (W.D. Wash. 1970); United States v.
Central Motor Lines, Inc., (II), 338 F. Supp. 532, 545-46, 4 F.E.P. 216, 227
(W.D.N.C. 1970); Strain v. Philpott, 331 F. Supp. 836, 842-43, 3 F.E.P. 922, 928
(M.D. Ala. 1971).
In United States v. Plumbers, Local 24, 364 F. Supp. 808, 826,
6 F.E.P. 366, 381 (D.N.J. 1973), the Government established deterrence by showing
that qualified blacks had moved out of the local area rather than seek referrals through
the local because they thought such efforts would be fruitless.
f
34. 416 F.2d 123, 132, 2 F.E.P. 127, 134 (8th Cir. 1969). See also United States
v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 369, 5 F.E.P. 823, 834 (8th Cir. 1973). Similarly, minority applicants may be reluctant to apply when an employer maintains an
educational or testing requirement. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of
Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 778, 788, 5 F.E.P. 570, 577 (D.
Conn.), a/I'd, 482 F.2d 1333, 5 F.E.P. 1344 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ity employment when there are no minorities waiting to enter. Thus,
the courts will issue preferential orders when, because of a lack of
applicants, merely eliminating a respondent's discriminatory practices
will not result in a sufficient number of minority applicants, and where
more moderate measures to attract minorities, such as stepped-up recruitment, will not generate a minority applicant flow. In some instances -the reasons for projecting failure of the more moderate
measures are not specified. In Castro v. Beecher,3" the Boston police
case, the First Circuit simply stated that the "dynamics [were] such as
to relegate to the future . . . the achievement of' equal opportunity
unless preferential relief was ordered. 6 Other holdings have been
more explicit. In United States v. Frazer,17 the district court cited
as its rationale the failure of previous recruiting efforts made by the
Alabama state employment service.
At the root of these holdings is the notion that preferential relief
is necessary when the respondent's reputation for discrimination is
such that merely ordering him to eliminate unlawful practices and to
increase minority recruiting will not generate minority applications.
The respondent's conduct in these cases has had a chilling effect, such
that minorities will apply in adequate numbers only if they hear of other
minority applicants being accepted for positions in his work force. As
the Eighth Circuit stated in Carter v. Gallagher,38 the Minneapolis fire
department case:
Given the past discriminatory hiring policies of the Minneapolis
Fire Department, which were well known in the minority community, it is not unreasonable to assume that minority persons will
still be reluctant to apply for employment, absent some positive
assurance that
if qualified they will in fact be hired on more than
89
a token basis.
35.

459 F.2d 725, 730, 4 F.E.P. 700, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1972).

36. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705-06, 4 F.E.P. 318, 320
(M.D. Ala. 1972), and - F. Supp. -, 7 F.E.P. 128 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Erie Human
Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 357 F. Supp. 422, 6 F.E.P. 18 (W.D. Pa.), and 360 F.
Supp. 628, 6 F.E.P. 733 (W.D. Pa. 1973).

37.

317 F. Supp. 1079, 2 F.E.P. 847 (M.D. Ala. 1970).

38. 452 F.2d 315, 331, 4 F.E.P. 121, 124-25 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
39. See also Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, - F. Supp. -,
-,
5 F.E.P. 566,

-, 5 E.P.D. 8406 at 7029 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United States v. Ironworkers, Local
10, - F. Supp. -, -, 6 F.E.P. 59, 70 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The Fifth Circuit denied

preferential relief in the Mississippi State Highway Patrol case on the ground that
there was "no evidence that the enforced recruiting measures ordered by the District

Court . . . [would] not be sufficient to assure all interested members of the minority
class that they will be hired by the Department .... ." Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d
960, 964, 5 F.E.P. 934, 936 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd and remanded, 491 F.2d 1053,
7 F.E.P. 586 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
In his partial dissent, Judge Goldberg
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Thus, preferential relief is used as an entering wedge in situations
where minorities have been excluded and are not likely to respond
to the conventional means of remedying exclusionary practices. The
relief undoes the continuing effect of discrimination and opens the
way for self-generating minority employment in the future. In other
words, this activist preferential theory looks ahead, while the compensatory preferential theory discussed above looks back.40
Such broad activist relief is especially effective in the craft union
situation where a substantial training period may be necessary to acquire appropriate skills. A minority high school student will not major
in plumbing if he sees that the plumbers' union does not license minority applicants. He will commit his time and effort to the training
only if he can be sure that he will receive nondiscriminatory treatment after completing the training. To see black plumbers on the
job at the time that he is to decide on whether to begin the training
would be more reassuring to him than a promise that he will be treated
fairly at some future date.
Cases of sex discrimination often pose a different 'but related problem. Women may ignore certain career opportunities not because
they fear they will be excluded, but because they feel and think employers feel that such work is not "appropriate" for women. This
stereotype develops 'because traditionally only men pursued the careers
in question. Preferential relief, therefore, may be necessary to break
down the stereotype. As part of the settlement of its recent suit against
the Bell System, the federal government obtained a pledge from Bell
that it would hire a certain percentage of females as linemen and technicians. 4
These jobs were traditionally held by males only. Presumably, the relief agreement with the Bell System is designed to
eliminate the stereotype and thereby to stimulate female interest in the
linemen's and technicians' jobs.4"
referred to "the long history of discrimination that will invariably operate as a strong
deterrent to black interest in the Patrol."
479 F.2d at 975, 5 F.E.P. at 942.

Preferential relief was also denied in Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F.
Supp. 1131, 6 F.E.P. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1973), on the ground that recruitment had
produced positive results. Similarly, in Harper v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
(II), 359 F. Supp. 1187, 5 F.E.P. 1050 (D. Md.), modified and a!t'd sub nom. Harper
v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 6 F.E.P. 880 (4th Cir. 1973), the court sought to increase
the percentage of applicant flow by limiting the hiring area for the Baltimore Fire Department to the City of Baltimore itself rather than the entire suburban area.

40. Note that the two theories may be applied in a compound manner to the same
set of facts.
41. See E.E.O.C. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., BNA F.E.P. MANUAL
§§ 431:73-431:123, 1 CCH EMP. PRAc. GutmE

1860 at 1533-3 through 1533-14 (E.D.

Pa. 1973) (consent decree).
42.

Id.
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Assuring against Discrimination Where the Respondent Will Not
Comply with a More Moderate Order

Preferential orders are also appropriate when the evidence shows
that the respondent will not honor a more lenient order to carry out
its hiring on a nondiscriminatory basis. Since the respondent will dis-

obey or circumvent such an order, the only way to insure his compliance with the fair employment laws is to order him outright to hire

a given number of minority workers.43

In cases in which this doc-

trine has been employed, the respondents had unmistakably indicated
that they would not comply with a more moderate order. They had
either violated the spirit of the previous order-as did Local 46 of
the Lathers union 4 -or shown an almost flagrant disregard for the
rights of minority persons. In the recent San Francisco firemen's
case, for example, where the employment testing requirement was at
issue, the district court three times ordered the local Civil Service
Commission to undertake test validation studies and to fill interim vacancies in a nondiscriminatory manner. Despite these orders the Civil
Service Commission failed to undertake validation studies and continued to hire whites almost exclusively. Finally, the court issued a preferential order, noting that to do so was the only way to assure equal
opportunity in the case.4"
43. Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 4 F.E.P. 12 (5th Cir. 1971).
44. United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 46, 471 F.2d
408, 5 F.E.P. 318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). See text accompanying notes 23 through 25 supra.
45. Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733, 73440, 6 F.E.P. 85, 86-92 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Other instances of prior failure to comply
followed by a harsher preferential order are United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472
F.2d 634, 5 F.E.P. 478 (6th Cir. 1973) (referral union made little effort to comply
with consent decree; minority referral had not increased three years after issuance of
decree while other unions in the local area had signficantly increased minority referrals); United States v. Operating Engineers, Local 520, 476 F.2d 1201, 5 F.E.P. 971
(7th Cir. 1973) (as part of its 1969 consent decree, the referral union had pledged
to give 20% of work opportunities to minority persons; in three years since pledge, less
than 7% of opportunities went to minorities); United States v. Detroit Edison Co., 365
F. Supp. 87, 6 F.E.P. 612 (E.D. Mich.) and - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1326 (E.D. Mich.
1973) (company used secret racial identification on its application form for discriminatory purposes, deliberately recruited minority persons with poor employment records so
as to limit minority promotions and arbitrarily refused promotions to qualified minority
persons); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. (I), 325 F. Supp. 478, 3 F.E.P.
354 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (company continued to hire on a discriminatory basis during
pendency of the Title VII suit); Local 53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost I. and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1 F.E.P. 577 (5th Cir. 1970) (union officials
stated that they would not consider blacks for referral); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 4 F.E.P. 864 (5th Cir. 1972) (school boards
continued using test requirements with intent to discriminate); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 3 F.E.P. 496 (9th Cir. 1971) (union officials committed overt acts of discrimination against black apprentices); Commonwealth v.
O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 4 F.E.P. 970 (E.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, - F.2d
-,
4 F.E.P. 1286 (3d Cir. 1972), reh'g en banc, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 F.E.P. 713 (3d
Cir. 1973) (percentage of minority policemen declined and rejection rate increased
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A Special Case: PreferentialRelief in PublicEmployment

Public employers were not subject to the provisions of Title VII
until passage of the 1972 amendments.4 6

Before 1972, though, a

number of challenges to the employment practices of state and local
governments were brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870.

Those acts grant to non-whites the same rights "to make and

enforce contracts" with public or private employers as are "enjoyed
by white citizens," and prohibit discrimination "under color of any state
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or territory."'4"
In these cases and in the handful of cases brought since Title VII
was amended courts have frequently ordered public employers, especially fire and police departments, to hire on a percentage basis.

The courts have taken the position that agencies which deal closely
with the public will better serve the public if minority persons are
in their workforces. Minority workers bring to the agencies a fuller
understanding of the problems of the minority community, and their
presence in the civil service assures the minority community of its stake

in government. With respect to minority representation on a municipal police force, one court has said:
[All1 citizens profit when the city achieves a racially integrated
police force of qualified individuals who are knowledgeable
of the diverse problems of different ethnic groups and who are
not prey to destructive hostility from minorities who feel excluded
from full participation in city government life. Clearly the general harmony of the community is enhanced by the city's obtaining
a police force representative of its population."8
when police department took over hiring formerly done by Civil Service Commission);
E.E.O.C. v. Plumbers, Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468, 2 F.E.P. 529 (S.D. Ohio), vacated
and remanded, 438 F.2d 408, 3 F.E.P. 193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832
(1971) (preferential order issued pursuant to finding that union failed to comply with
prior court decree); United States v. Plumbers, Local 24, 364 F. Supp. 808, 6 F.E.P.
366 (D.N.J.) and 364 F. Supp. 831, 6 F.E.P. 385 (D.N.J. 1973) (referral union had
consistently discouraged the initiation of government programs to train minority plumbers).
46. See sections 701(b) and 701(e) of the 1972 Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(b) and
2000e(e) (1974).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
-, 6
48. N.A.A.C.P. v. Civil Service Comm'n of San Francisco, - F. Supp. -,
8956 at 6064 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See also Bridgeport
F.E.P. 1285, 1288, 6 E.P.D.
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 134041, 5 F.E.P. 1344, 1350 (2d Cir. 1973). See Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 125556, 2 F.E.P. 1024, 1025 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (school
department).
The school cases also suggest that preferences may be appropriate to assure equal
opportunity when an employer has had to reduce his work force. School integration
frequently entails a reduction in personnel; and in Singleton v. Jacksonville Municipal
School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 396 U.S. 290
(1970), the Fifth Circuit developed a plan to assure that the cutbacks would not have
a long range effect on black principals and teachers. The Singleton court held that
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There are also practical considerations which dictate percentage relief in public employment cases. In many such cases (1) the plaintiffs are challenging the validity of civil service entrance examinations;
(2) the employer has virtually excluded blacks from the work force;
(3) the jobs sought are entry-level jobs for which little training is
required; and (4) the employer hires a fixed number of workers
at fixed intervals, i.e., he hires by class rather than as openings occur.
If discrimination is found in these circumstances, the most practical
solution may be to order percentage hiring. Against the background
of outright exclusion-where quick, sure relief is needed-a percentage order may be more effective than lengthy, complex efforts to validate or revise the employment examination. Since little training is
required for the jobs in question, it can be assured that there will
be a sufficient number of qualified workers in the minority work force.
And the fact that the employer hires a certain number of workers
at regular intervals seems to make it easier to order him to hire a
certain number of minority workers at such intervals.
The area of public employment is very much unexplored. As the
courts come to learn more about public employment-and, in particular, about civil service tests-they are likely to turn less and less
to percentage relief. Instead, they will be in a position to remedy
discrimination by identifying and eliminating the particular practices
that are operating to discriminate, rather than to administer "rough
justice" through percentage decrees. However, if the courts do believe that a racial mix makes the civil service more effective as a
whole, percentages should continue to be a consideration in public
employment cases.
OBJECTIONS TO ORDERS OF PREFERENTIAL RELIEF

Even though there are theoretical bases in support of orders for preferential relief, critics still raise strong objections. The courts have
rejected some of these criticisms outright; they have been troubled
by others; and they have responded both by requiring a showing of
special circumstances before granting preferential relief and by tailorwhen a school board dismisses or demotes a staff member pursuant to a plan of integra-

tion, it must fill a subsequent vacancy with a person of the same race as the person

displaced unless the person displaced declines the position. Id. at 1218. Similar plans
might be appropriate in the private employment situation when the burden of discharges and layoffs brought about by slack economic conditions has fallen disproportionately on blacks (as is usually the case when the employer has only recently hired

blacks and the layoffs are based on seniority).

See Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 5 F.E.P. 204 (2d Cir. 1972), for a more detailed discussion of

the problems arising from a layoff situation of this sort.
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ing their orders to minimize the force of substantive objections. This
section of the article examines these objections from a theoretical point
of view. The next section will review the courts' practical response
to the objections.
Title VII Itself PrecludesPreferentialRelief
Section 703 (j) of Title VII provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex
or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin employed by any employer, . . . in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other
area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, sec49
tion, or other area.
Respondents have regularly argued that this section of the statute bars
courts from ordering percentage preferential relief. The courts have
held, however, that section 703 (j) merely precludes a court from entering a finding of discrimination based solely on the existence of racial
imbalance in the respondent's work force, not from entering an order
requiring preferential hiring once a violation has been found. 0 As
the Sixth Circuit said in 1970:
When the stated purpose of the Act and the broad affirmative
relief authorization . . . are read in context with [§ 703(j)],
we believe that section cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination...
which have the practical effect of continuing past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of
the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51
This interpretation accurately reflects the intent of the authors of section 703(j). Senator Williams explained that the section was designed
strictly to prevent a finding of discrimination on the basis of imbalance.5 2
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (1974).
50.

United States v. Local 212, IBEW, -

F. Supp.

-,

-,

5 F.E.P. 469, 476 (S.D.

Ohio 1972), aff'd, 472 F.2d 634, 5 F.E.P. 478 (6th Cir. 1973).
51. United States v. I.B.E.W., Local 38, 429 F.2d 144, 149-50, 2 F.E.P. 716, 720
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). See also United States v. Ironworkers,
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-53, 3 F.E.P. 496, 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971); United States v. Lathers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413, 5 F.E.P. 318, 321
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
52. See 110 CONG. REc. 8921 (1964) (remarks of Senator Williams (D.-N.J.)). See
also 110 CONG. REC. 9881 (1964) (remarks of Senator Allott (R.-Colo.)).
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The Windfall Argument

A general equitable argument has been advanced that preferential
relief is impermissible because those individuals who benefit from such
relief are not the same individuals who were victimized by the unlawful discrimination which is being remedied. Proponents of this criticism
argue that a minority worker is entitled to relief only when he is the
victim who has suffered the discrimination; he is not to be benefited
simply because he belongs to a minority group. If the specific discriminatees cannot be compensated, they argue, others should not receive a windfall."
One can reply to the criticism in two ways: (i) as explained above,
preferential relief may be ordered to eliminate the past effects of
deterrence. Conceptually speaking, past deterrence has operated on
the black work force as a whole. Hence, each and every member
of the black work force is a discriminatee. Further, since it is precisely because of the employer's deterrent practices that individual victims
cannot be identified or no longer seek jobs, the respondent employer
or union should not be able to argue that relief should go only to
specifically designated individuals. (ii) Preferential relief is also designed to generate more minority applications. For this purpose it
is not necessary that the recipients of such relief be actual victims
of discrimination. The relief is designed not so much to compensate
individual discriminatees as to demonstrate to the work force as a whole
that jobs are now open to minority workers.
In the face of these arguments, the "windfall" claim often advanced
by respondents is not likely to succeed in preventing preferential relief. Yet, in some cases a court might sufficiently be troubled by the
idea that relief may go to the undeserving to convince it to limit the
class of recipients to those minority groups from which the victims
came, even if it cannot be determined exactly which individuals in
the class were the victims. Thus, for instance, if preferential relief
is ordered to eliminate the effects of a practice that ceased in 1972,
a court might restrict such relief to those who were qualified and available for work before 1972."
There are two arguments which are far more troublesome. One
is the statutory "merit" objection; the other is the constitutional equal
protection objection.
53.

See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329, 4 F.E.P. 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1972),

modifying 452 F.2d 315, 3 F.E.P. 900 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950

(1972).
54.

See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Plumbers, Local 189,

Ohio 1972) (on remand).
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The Merit Objection

The civil rights laws prohibit employers from taking race into account in their employment decisions. 5 While the statutes do not specifically require employers to hire on the basis of ability, the courts
have defined fair employment decisions to be decisions which are
made by employers on the basis of ability alone.5" In the words of
the First Circuit:
Equal opportunity is an elusive concept, but at its core it carries
the simple mandate that opportunities
should be open to all on
57
the basis of competence alone.
This competence-based equal opportunity concept reflects a fundamental principle of our free enterprise system. In theory a society
can distribute its goods in a number of ways: equally, on the basis
of rank, or on the basis of need. In the work force our society distributes opportunity on the basis of merit. That basis stimulates people
to produce the most and to develop their skills to the fullest for the
benefit of society and residually, of course, for their own benefit.
The possibility that a white applicant with superior qualifications
will lose out under a preferential scheme of relief is a troublesome
one, 58 and the courts have not met the problem head-on. Rather,
as we shall see below, they have restricted their preferential orders
to circumstances in which white workers' opportunities will not be significantly affected; and they have tailored each order to minimize its
impact on whites. This tendency to compromise may indicate the
merit of the reverse discrimination argument insofar as the need always to compromise reflects weakness in the preferential doctrine.
The proponents of preferential relief have developed a number of responses to the reverse discrimination argument, but none is totally persuasive.
55. See section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1974), and sections I and
3 of the post civil war acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1970), discussed in text
accompanying notes 7 and 49 supra.

56.

The courts have developed this definition in their efforts to allocate the burden

of proof in fair employment cases. Conceptually, a race-free decision and a decision
on the merits in hiring may be distinct (an employer could, for example, decide to hire
only left-handed people). But since discrimination may be masked by what seem to
be racially neutral policies, the courts have struck down any practice which disproportionately rejects blacks unless it is grounded in considerations of competence. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
57. Associated General Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18, 6 F.E.P. 1013,
1020 (lst Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1974).

58.

See Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248, 5 F.E.P.

362 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329, 4 F.E.P. 121, 123 (8th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Commonwealth v. O'Neill. 348

F. Supp. 1084, 4 F.E.P. 970 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in part, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 F.E.P.
713 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
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One such response is that the federal courts have traditionally issued
preferential orders to remedy discrimination in the contexts of jury
selection,59 public education 60 and public housing.6 ' Hence, by analogy, percentage relief in employment cases should be appropriate.
The argument is weak, though, because in those other areas we do
not distribute on the basis of merit. Juries are selected at random;
public education is distributed equally; and public housing is assigned
on the basis of need. It is not clear that preferential relief would
be ordered in circumstances like employment where distribution is
made on the basis of merit.
In DeFunis v. Odegaard62 the Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to consider preferential treatment in the context of law
school admissions, where merit is at least one selection factor. The
DeFunis suit challenged the University of Washington Law School's
policy of taking race into account in its admissions process. The suit
was brought in Washington state court by Marco DeFunis, a white student whose application for admission to the law school had been rejected. As the school's admissions process operated, the school computed a "predicted first year average" for each applicant to predict
performance in law school on the basis of grades and test scores. The
school relied heavily on these predicted averages in making its admissions decisions. The school also took favorably into account other factors such as recommendations, the employment record of the applicant
and race; a university background also served as a positive factor. As
a result of its consideration of these other factors, the predicted averages of the minority applicants who were admitted were lower than
the averages of many whites admitted. DeFunis, of course, claimed
that this policy unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of
race, pointing out that the school had admitted a number of minority
students whose predicted averages were lower than his.
The state trial court sustained DeFunis' claim on the ground that
any racial classification is unconstitutional. But the state supreme
court reversed, stating that the school had a legitimate interest in having a racially mixed student body and in preparing minority persons
for the practice of law. The United States Supreme Court granted
59.

Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).

60. Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
61. Otero v. New York Housing Authority, 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and
remanded, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967), 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Il. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d
306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
62. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 42 U.S.L.W. 4578 (U.S. April 23, 1974) (No. 73-235).
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certiorari and heard argument of the case in February, 1974. The
Court's decision, however, unfortunately failed to cast definitive light
on the question of the availability of remedial preferences in areas
where distribution is made on the basis of merit. The Court declared
the case moot and refused to reach the merits because, regardless of
what decision might be reached in the case, DeFunis would complete
his law studies as scheduled. The fact that certiorari was granted,
however, indicates that the Court may choose to face the issue in the
future.
With respect to merit distribution, however, law school admissions
are distinguishable from admissions to employment. As the Washington Supreme Court stated, academic merit is not the only factor in
law school admissions. Law schools have always taken into account
other factors which bear on an applicant's ability to perform well in
legal studies. Yet employment decisions are made entirely on the
basis of merit. If at some time in the future the Supreme Court upholds policies such as that presented in DeFunis, it will nevertheless
remain to be seen whether the decision will stand as authority for the
proposition that remedial preferences are constitutionally available in
areas in which distribution is made on the basis of merit alone.
A second reply to the merit criticism advanced by the advocates of
preferential relief is that under a preferential scheme whites are not
in fact injured; rather, minorities are compensated. Since the relief
places the minority group member in the position that he would have
been in but for the discrimination, the white cannot legitimately claim
to have lost anything. Or, to put it another way, white expectations
are grounded in unlawful practices; hence, whites cannot complain
when because of preferential relief they are kept from availing themselves of expectancies.
However, the white person who finally loses out because of a preferential scheme may not be the same white who gained from the
past discrimination. The person who profited from the discrimination
has his job and cannot be bumped out of it. 3 He who loses out may
be a current white applicant with genuinely superior qualifications.
Another difficulty with the reply is that sometimes the conceptual line
between "unlawful expectancy" and "merit" can be a very thin one.
Surely the son of a union member whose expectation of union membership is based on the union's policy of nepotism has no valid claim
63. See, e.g., Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 5 F.E.P. 204
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Paperworkers, Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 1 F.E.P. 875 (5th Cir. 1969).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 315

to membership. 64 But would his expectation be illegitimate if it were
based instead on the superior training that he received at an all-white
high school? And would his claim be stronger, or weaker, if he had
decided to pursue a special high school curriculum because of expectations based on a trade union's nepotism policy?
The Supreme Court's ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power Company 5
suggests that whites may have only limited rights in these circumstances. In striking down the power company's racially discriminatory high
school diploma and testing requirements, the Court did remark that
the whites could not avail themselves of advantages gained from a racially discriminatory educational system: 6
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
• . . [O]n the record in the present case, "whites register far
better on the Company's alternative requirements" than Negroes
... . This consequence would appear to be directly traceable
to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation
to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are
Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools ...
The point of Griggs, however, is that the discriminatory diploma
and testing requirements are unlawful because they are unrelated to
job performance, i.e., that a superior education was not necessarily
an advantage for purposes of work at the power company. Hence
the Court's remarks are only dicta, and the decision leaves open the
question whether an employer or a union has the social responsibility
to discount disadvantages resulting from general social discrimination
when such disadvantages do in fact bear on job performance. 6 7 Mr.
Justice Douglas, who would have reached the merits in DeFunis,68 de64. United States v. Roadway Express, 457 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, - F. Supp. -, -, 6 F.E.P. 899, 901 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
65. 401 U.S. 424, 430-31, 3 F.E.P. 175, 177 (1971).

66.

Id. at 430, 3 F.E.P. at 177.

293 (1969)

Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285,

(county's use of literacy test for voters unlawfully discriminated against

Negro citizens because the county had provided Negroes with separate and inferior
schooling).

67.

Of course, when the disadvantages result from the respondent's discrimination,

e.g., when blacks have been denied training or experience, he must discontinue it and
develop programs to rid blacks of the disadvantages. See, e.g., United States v. United
States Steel Corp., - F. Supp. -, -, 5 F.E.P. 1253, 1270 (D. Ala. 1973) (decree

ordering steel plant to train blacks for skilled crafts).
68. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 42 U.S.L.W. 4578, 4582 (U.S. April 23, 1974) (No. 73-235)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).

Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting with Mr. Justice Brennan,

would have remanded the case for a new trial to consider, inter alia, whether the estab-
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voted some discussion in his dissent to the notion of social responsibil-

ity in the context of applications for admission to a state university's
law school. But the social responsibility argument may be less persuasive in the context of private industry than in that of public education.
If the Supreme Court in a future case limits universities' authority to
prefer minority applicants over qualified whites, it is unlikely that the
Griggs dicta will be carried far in private employment cases.
A third reply to the reverse discrimination argument advanced by

supporters of preferential relief is that a white cannot claim with any
certainty that he is more qualified than others for a position because
concepts of merit are generally not related to job performance. This
argument has some force in circumstances where Title VII violations
have been found. A hiring standard that violates Title VII is by def-

inition not job-related, and until job-related standards are developed
no applicant, minority or not, can be sure that his qualifications are
superior.6 9 Nevertheless, all but the most menial jobs require some
training or skill and those persons who meet the prerequisites should

have first claim to the jobs.

Thus, when the courts determine that

a hiring standard is unlawful, they are more likely to pare down the
standard to make it job-related, rather than to eliminate it. In EEOC
v. Plumbers, Local 189,70 for example, a five-year experience requirement for union membership was modified to three years. 71 This ap-

proach may not satisfy the purists who argue that job standards are
lished LSAT tests should be eliminated or redesigned so far as racial minorities are
concerned because of their built-in cultural bias. But his analysis may foreshadow a
negative judicial attitude toward remedial preferences in general:
The key to the problem is the consideration of each application in a racially
neutral way. . . . The reason for the separate treatment of minorities as a
class is to make more certain that racial factors do not militate against an
applicant or on his behalf.
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. . . . A Defunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is
he subject to any disability, no matter his race or color. Whatever his race,
he had a constitutional right to have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner.
42 U.S.L.W. at 4584-85 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original). Moreover, Justice
Douglas' citation of Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), upholding a contempt conviction barring picketing which sought to force preferential hiring, hints that
he may disfavor preferential relief in the employment field as well.
69. See Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1104, 4 F.E.P. 970, 985
(E.D. Pa. 1972), vacated and remanded, - F.2d -, 4 F.E.P. 1286 (3d Cir. 1972),
and 473 F.2d 1029, 5 F.E.P. 713 (3d Cir. 1973).
70. 311 F. Supp. 468, 2 F.E.P. 529 (S.D. Ohio 1970), vacated and remanded, 438
F.2d 408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971).
71. See also United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 133,
2 F.E.P. 127, 135 (8th Cir. 1969) (experience requirement modified); United States
v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 360 F. Supp. 979, 989-90, 6 F.E.P. 319, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (referral union to shorten experience requirement to recognize training acquired
in programs other than its own training program and to discontinue background check).
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totally irrelevant and hence that a white cannot claim superior qualifications in any circumstances. It does, however, silence any such claims
that are made on the basis of inflated or irrelevant standards; and,
of course, a modification of standards opens the door to employment
for more minorities.
In summary, the proponents' responses to the reverse discrimination
argument against preferential relief are not altogether persuasive. At
some point, the courts will encounter a white person who can legitimately say that he is more qualified for a given position that the nonwhite person who will fill it under a preferential scheme. In these
circumstances, the argument for preferential relief boils down to the
proposition that, in the given situation, the need for significant relief
from discrimination for the minority work force outweighs the employment needs of the individual white. As the district court said in
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Oglivie:
Basic self-interests of the individual must be balanced with social
interests and in circumstances where blacks have been discrimininated against for years, there is no alternative but [preferential relief] .... 72
The Equal ProtectionObjection
Respondents have argued that, in these employment discrimination
circumstances, the equal protection clause prohibits the government
from classifying individuals on the basis of race, and, therefore, that
court-ordered preferential treatment is unconstitutional. Like the reverse discrimination problem, the constitutional question is troublesome. 73 The equal protection clause has traditionally been used to
outlaw unequal treatment, not to sanction it.
The cases have merely touched on the problem. Southern Illinois
Builders Ass'n v. Oglivie,74 Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Schultz, 75
and N.A.A.C.P. v. Civil Service Commission of San Francisco7 6 simply
72. 327 F. Supp. 1154, 1159, 3 F.E.P. 571, 575 (S.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d
680, 5 F.E.P. 229 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 33031, 4 F.E.P. 121, 124 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Vulcan
Soc'y of N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New York, F.2d -, -, 6 F.E.P. 1045, 1053, 6 E.P.D. 38947 at 6141 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. The constitutional question has arisen in the related contexts of government-ordered affirmative action programs, e.g., the Philadelphia Plan, and public employment
cases, apparently because government action in these cases clearly constitutes state action under the fourteenth amendment. The constitutional question could arise in the
case of a private employer since a court order would also constitute state action.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Thus far, though, the courts have discussed
only statutory considerations in private employer cases.
74. 471 F.2d 680, 686, 5 F.E.P. 229, 234 (7th Cir. 1972).
75. 442 F.2d 159, 176, 3 F.E.P. 395, 407 (3d Cir. 1971).
76. - F. Supp. -, -, 6 F.E.P. 1285, 1292, 6 E.P.D. f 8956 at 6071 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
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held that preferential treatment designed to remedy discrimination is
77
permissible. In Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School District
a plan which would have precluded white promotions for up to five
8
years was held unconstitutional. In Carter v. Gallagher,"
the Minneapolis fire department case, the Eighth Circuit noted with very little
discussion that the absolute preference ordered by the district court
would infringe on the constitutional rights of non-minorities, but that
an order requiring the fire department to hire "a reasonable ratio of
minority persons" would "accommodate" the constitutional rights of
non-minorities and minorities.
The First Circuit's recent holding in Associated General Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler7 1 offers the first extended discussion
of the equal protection issue. In Altshuler, a contractor's group challenged a provision in their public contract which required them to employ 20% minorities in constructing Boston State College. The State
of Massachusetts had developed the contract provision because of the
results of a study of employment in the state's construction industry.
The study found a severe racial imbalance existed in the construction industry in the Boston area (only 4% of the work went
to blacks while 23% of the population was black), s°O The study concluded that the imbalance was the result of racial discrimination by
the contractors and the construction unions and that prior, more
moderate federal affirmative action programs had failed to remedy the
discrimination. For the Boston State College project, the 20% requirement meant that the contractors would have to hire between 10 and
30 minority workers. The minority population in the college area was
40%.
The contractors claimed that the court-imposed preferential requirement was unconstitutional since it required them to classify workers
on the basis of race contrary to the racially "blind" equal protection
clause. The court rejected their claim, stating as a general proposition that percentage hiring to remedy past discrimination was permissible. The court explained:
The first Justice Harlan's much quoted observation that "the Constitution [is color-blind] . . .[and] does not ... permit any public
authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in
77. 357 F. Supp. 248, 254, 5 F.E.P. 362, 366 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Harper
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (II), 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1214, 5 F.E.P. 1050,
1069 (D. Md. 1973) ("[Q]uotas may not be valid ingredients in relief").
78. 452 F.2d 315, 330, 4 F.E.P. 121, 124 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972).
79. 490 F.2d 9, 6 F.E.P. 1013 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, -U.S. - (1974).
80. Id. at 13-14, 6 F.E.P. at 1016.
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the enjoyment of such rights," Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
. . . (1896) (dissenting opinion) has come to represent a longterm goal. It is by now well understood, however, that our society
cannot be completely colorblind in the short term if we are to
have a colorblind society in the long term. After centuries of
viewing through colored lenses, eyes do not quickly adjust when the
lenses are removed. Discrimination has a way of perpetuating itself, albeit unintentionally, because the resulting inequalities make
new opportunities less accessible. Preferential treatment is one
partial prescription to remedy our society's most intransigent and
deeply rooted inequalities. 8 '
The court went on to say that, in the employment context, preferential orders are permissible when a "compelling need exists to remedy
serious racial imbalance" resulting from discrimination and when "the
means chosen to implement the compelling interest [are] . . . rea-

sonably related to the desired end."8 2 As to whether there was a
compelling need to remedy imbalance, the court said:
[T]here is no question that a compelling need exists to remedy
serious racial imbalance in the construction trades, particularly in [the college area] . . . where minorities constitute ap-

proximately forty per cent of the population, and yet only about
four per cent of the membership of buildings [sic] trade unions, and
where there has been a long history of racial discrimination in
those unions. Such an imbalance within the relatively lucrative,
highly visible, and expanding construction trades undermines efforts
elsewhere in the economy, and conat achieving equal opportunity
83
tributes to racial tensions.
The court concluded that a 20% preference was a "reasonable" means
of meeting the need since the contractors were not required to hire
unqualified workers (i.e., 10 to 30 blacks was a "realistic" figure and,
under the terms of the contract, the contractors had the opportunity
to explain any failures to meet that figure).8 '
In the circumstances of the Altshuler case, which included severe
imbalance, clear discrimination, and a history of ineffective affirmative action programs, the need for dramatic relief was clear. In such
a case the court's approval of a feasible percentage is not likely to
provoke serious challenge. Yet, the decision leaves some unanswered
conceptual questions. First, is it self-evident that percentage treatment is constitutional? As the contractors noted, the principle of
81. Id. at 16, 6 F.E.P. at 1018.
82. Id. at 18, 6 F.E.P. at 1020.
83. Id. at 18, 6 F.E.P. at 1019-20 (footnotes omitted).
84. Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 360 F. Supp. 628, 629, 6 F.E.P. 733,
734 (W.D. Pa. 1973), presents a similar but less comprehensive analysis.
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color blindness is at the core of our constitutional system. Although
the courts have given lip service to the notion that racial classification
is permissible when there is a compelling need for the classification,
the Supreme Court has not, except in a wartime emergency, 5 sanctioned
racial distinctions. In the background of this precedent, the Altshuler
court justified Massachusetts' color-conscious provision on three
grounds: it is remedial; it will lead to a color-blind society; and it
is only temporary. All three justifications are open to question.
The court seemed to say that a color-conscious order of preference
is constitutionally permissible because it undoes the effects of previous
unlawful color-conscious preferences. The idea that two wrongs make
a right is not, of course, a proper principle of constitutional interpretation. If A steals property from B, B is entitled to have his property back,
but he cannot steal it back. Similarly, if A takes a job from B because
of a color-conscious policy, B should not gain the job by means of
another color-conscious scheme, however laudable the ends. 6 Further,
as explained above, the one who loses out in a preferential scheme
is usually not A (the white who gained from the discrimination), but
C (the current applicant who took no part in the original discrimination). B's constitutional rights may be vindicated but C's are lost. One
wrong may be "remedied," but another identical wrong is committed.
Nor will preferential relief necessarily lead to a color-blind society.
Because they are racially focused, preferential orders may heighten
racial consciousness and further postpone the day when we will reach
color blindness in our society. In particular, the white applicant who
believes that he has been deprived of a job simply because he is white
is bound to be more conscious of race than ever. Further, as the
Anderson court pointed out, percentage preferences may in time become restrictive quotas.8 " Once the Massachusetts contractors hired
their thirtieth black applicant, they could use the percentage provision
8s
as a means of rejecting other blacks.
Nor is it clear that the temporary nature of the preferential relief
makes it constitutional. The courts have generally not permitted tem85. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
86. In response it could be argued that B is given the job because he is a discriminatee, not because he is black.
87. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248, 249-50, 5
P.E.P. 362, 363-64 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
88. Similarly, granting preferences to one minority group may affect the interests
of other minorities. An employer who is ordered to hire a percentage of blacks, for
example, may redirect his discrimination toward Spanish-surnamed Americans or Orientals. Even if he does not do so, an order redressing the grievances of one minority
group offers no assurance that the problems of other minorities will be solved or dealt
with at all.
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porary suspensions of fundamental constitutional guarantees. The
Korematsu89 case is weak precedent, at best, for doing so. It was
decided in a wartime emergency where the need for speedy, discriminating treatment may have been essential to national survival. In any
event, the First Circuit's emphasis on the temporary nature of the
Massachusetts program in Altshuler suggests that a permanent percentage hiring order would be held unconstitutional. As will be
explained below, the courts have been careful to limit the duration
of their preferential orders.
Aside from the issue of whether preferences are permissible at all,
there exists the question of choosing a proper standard of judicial review for passing on preferential programs. As a general rule, a classification is permissible if it is reasonably related to the achievement
of a permissible governmental purpose. 90 Since race is a "suspect
classification," however, the standard of review for a racial classification is more stringent.9 ' A racial classification is permissible only if
there is both an overriding purpose (or compelling need) for the classification and the classification is necessary to the achievement of that
purpose. In order for the classification to be necessary to the achievement of the purpose, a means focused on matters other -than race must
be unavailable. 92
The First Circuit in Altshuler applied a mixed test for equal protection. It said that preferences were only permissible if there was a
compelling need for them, but that preferential schemes need only
be "reasonably related" to fulfillment of the need. The court used
the more restrained "reasonably related" test presumably because it
considered preferential classifications to be in the spirit of the equal
protection clause, and hence not suspect. As outlined above, there
are many reasons for examining preferential classification with a suspect eye and authorizing them only if a more moderate order will not
remedy the discrimination. In the employment discrimination area
the courts can generally turn to a number of more moderate remedies: revised hiring standards, stepped up recruitment, remedial
training, etc. The availability of alternatives suggests that a court
should order a percentage preference remedy only when absolutely neces89. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
90. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 55 (1973).
91. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Developments in the Law
-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1088-1120 (1969).
92. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972); cf. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward: Toward a Model of
Roles in the Due Processof Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973).

342

1974

Preferential Employment

sary-and then only to the extent necessary.9 3
most courts have, in fact, applied this standard.

As noted above,94

The constitutional equal protection issue is a sticky one, and
Altshuler does not resolve it. In the end, the courts may never resolve
the issue because it involves the accommodation of two conflicting
social interests-the interest in remedying discrimination and the interest in having every hiring decision made on a color-blind basis. If
carefully tailored preferential schemes are sought by plaintiffs in situations where the discrimination has been blatant, the courts are not
likely to be troubled by the constitutional issue. In closer cases, however, the courts are likely to respond as they did in Carter 5 and in

Anderson"o by paring down or rejecting a preferential scheme.
THE PRACTICAL RESPONSE
The criticisms of preferential relief--especially the reverse discrimi-

nation argument-reflect some very basic values.

Consequently even

in the theoretical situations outlined above,9 7 the courts have issued
preferential orders only when they found additional equitable circumstances; and, even then, they have tailored their orders to minimize
the force of criticisms. Among those additional circumstances, the following factors are significant.
Evidence That the Injury to the Black Work Force Has Been Substantial
Substantial injury makes immediate and thoroughgoing relief all the
more necessary. Such injury occurs when the respondent has virtually
excluded blacks from his work force for years9" or when the respondent
93. Admittedly the rational relationship test may have become more stringent in recent years. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Current academic dissatisfaction with the two-tiered equal protection analysis, prompted by cases such as
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), may also call for revision of the analysis applied in Altshuler. See generally Note, A Question of Balance:
Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. Rnv. 155
(1973).
94. See text accompanying notes 18 through 48 supra.
95. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 4 F.E.P. 121 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
96. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248, 5 F.E.P.
362 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
97. See text accompanying notes 18 through 48 supra.
98. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 4 F.E.P. 121 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (one black fireman in twenty-five years); United States
v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 2 F.E.P. 741 (W.D. Wash. 1970), afJ'd,
443 F.2d 544, 3 F.E.P. 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (less than
one per cent of union members were black); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, - F. Supp.
-, -, 5 F.E.P. 277, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in part, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 F.E.P. 713
(3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (recent increase in rejection rate of blacks and decline of
percentage of blacks on police force); United States v. Operating Engineers, Local 520,
476 F.2d 1201, 5 F.E.P. 971 (7th Cir. 1973) (in 1968, no blacks among 1124 union

343

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 315

holds the key to minority employment in a particular trade, either because of his size or monopoly position, 9 or when large numbers of
qualified blacks have been available for work. 100

Indeed, proof of

existence of some qualified and available minority workers is essential
in order to prove a violation, let alone to gain preferential relief.' 0 1
Evidence That Preferential Hiring Will Not Substantially Affect Employment Opportunitiesfor White Workers
The courts are more inclined to order preferential relief when the
relief will only minimally affect the opportunities of whites: when industry conditions are generally favorable;102 when the respondent's
work force is expanding, so that there will be positions for nonminority
workers as well as for minorities ;103 or when few white workers are

seeking jobs.' 04

Courts frequently issue preferential orders in cases

members); Arnold v. Ballard, - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 287 (N.D. Ohio), and - F.
Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 899 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (no blacks on Akron police force or on eligibility list despite 17.5% black population); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 10, F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (no blacks among 1150 union members).
99. Most of the referral unions in the cases cited in note 10 supra effectively controlled the work opportunities in their respective trades. Local 86 of the Ironworkers,
for instance, controlled 90% of the iron trade work in Seattle. See United States v.
Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 3 F.E.P. 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971). Similarly, a public employer such as a school board or fire department
by its nature has a monopoly over certain jobs in the given area. When a monopoly
employer has denied opportunity to workers, he is not, of course, in a position to resist
the order of preferential relief on the ground that minority workers lack the requisite
experience for employment.
100. The reason for the en banc decision in Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d
1029, 5 F.E.P. 713 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc), was that the lower court did not limit
the pool from which blacks were to be chosen to include only those applicants qualified to be policemen.
101. See Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960, 974, 5 F.E.P. 934, 942 (5th Cir.)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting and concurring in part), at 'd and remanded, 491 F.2d 1053,
7 F.E.P. 586 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). The courts are generally willing to assume
that minority workers are as available as whites for a given type of work. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ironworkers, Local 10, - F. Supp. -, -,
6 F.E.P. 59, 70 (W.D.
Mo. 1973). The fact that the courts have not issued preferential orders in sex discrimination cases may stem from their reluctance to assume that females are necessarily
available for work. Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1152, 5 F.E.P.
493, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
102. See, e.g., Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos
Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051-52, 1 F.E.P. 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1969) (critical
need for insulators); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 10, F. Supp. -, -,
6
F.E.P. 59, 65 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (work conditions in ironwork trade consistently
"good").
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Neill, - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 277 (E.D. Pa.
1972), ajf'd in part, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 F.E.P. 713 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (funds
for 900 new policemen available); Buckner v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 339 F.
Supp. 1108, 1125, 4 F.E.P. 648, 660 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 1287, 5 F.E.P.
1165 (5th Cir. 1973) (company planned to hire eight apprentices per year); United
States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l U., Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412, 5 F.E.P.
318, 320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (250 openings anticipated).
104. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz, 442 F.2d 159,
3 F.E.P. 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d
1254, 2 F.E.P. 1024 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (qualified
whites not excluded by preferential plans).
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involving referral unions or civil service hiring. In part, this may be
because preferential relief merely postpones rather than eliminates opportunities for whites in those situations. A prospective white worker
is not denied a job altogether; rather, he is merely placed lower on
the union referral or civil service list, with at least the theoretical assurance that he will eventually have a job.'"5
Evidence That Remedial Preferences Will Not Substantially Affect the
Employer's Operations
Courts are most likely to choose preferential relief against an employer whose profits will not be affected by such an order. Consequently,
most targets of preferential orders have been high-profit or nonprofit
employers. Moreover, a respondent who has waived his hiring standards for whites is also a prime target for preferential relief. If he
can operate effectively with unqualified whites, he should hardly be
permitted to claim that hiring qualified blacks will undermine his business. 106 Similarly, the courts are more inclined to order a respondent
to give preferential treatment when his competitors or neighboring
businesses have done so without any difficulty.10 7
Evidence of a DiscriminatoryMotive
Most violations of the fair employment laws are not motivated by
bias. Generally an employer is engaging in a practice which appears
racially neutral and job-related to him but which in fact rejects blacks
and fails to serve a business purpose. 0 8 His violation is all the more
severe when his motives are discriminatory. In many cases where preferential orders have been issued, the employer has acted with a discriminatory motive. 0 9 Apparently, the courts feel less compunction
105. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 133-34,
2 F.E.P. 127, 135 (8th Cir. 1969); Arnold v. Ballard, - F. Supp. -, -, 6 F.E.P.
287, 301 (N.D. Ohio 1973). In Anderson v. San Francisco School Dist., 357 F. Supp.
248, 5 F.E.P. 362 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the San Francisco School District's preferential
scheme for promotion of staff members was overturned. The court's objection to the
plan was not based on any principled opposition to preferential treatment in general,
but rather on the fact that the proposal would have precluded white promotions for
the next five years or more.
106. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 5 F.E.P. 823
(4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. (II), 338 F. Supp. 532,
541-42, 4 F.E.P. 216, 223-24 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 5 F.E.P. 478 (6th
Cir. 1973), where it was shown that other construction locals had successfully implemented preferential programs.
108. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
109. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 95, 6 F.E.P. 612, 618
(E.D. Mich. 1973) and - F. Supp. -, 6 F.E.P. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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about imposing a stringent order when the violation has been severe
and premeditated. 110
Thus, in summary, the courts are more inclined to order preferential
relief when the injury to the minority work force has been substantial,
the effect of the relief on the majority work force and the employer
is minimal, and the employer's motive is discriminatory. Even in
these additional circumstances, though, the courts have carefully narrowed their orders to minimize the force of the criticisms against preferential relief. They have done so in the following ways:
(i) Preferential orders are not drafted to require the employer to
hire only minority persons; rather, they require only that a certain percentage of his hirees be black."' In this way the expectations of whites
are diminished rather than eliminated and fewer qualified whites are
turned away."'
(ii) The duration- of preferential orders is limited to the range of
three to five years or until minority workers compose a certain percentage of the respondent's work force. Preferential relief should be
used as a short-term means, not as a long-term end. Respondents must
engage in preferential hiring only to assure equal opportunity, not to
maintain a perpetually balanced work force. 1 3 Similarly, many preferential orders are interim in nature. As such, the orders are designed
to assure minority representation until the court can examine the facts
and history of the particular case more fully.' 1 4
110. Id.
S11. In theory this percentage should reflect the percentage of minorities in the relevant work force. See Buckner v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108,
1125, 4 F.E.P. 648, 660 (N.D. Ala. 1972), a!i'd, 476 F.2d 1287, 5 F.E.P. 1165 (5th
Cir. 1973); Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (II), 359 F. Supp. 1187,
1193, 5 F.E.P. 1050, 1053 (D. Md. 1973), modified and affd sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 6 F.E.P. 880 (4th Cir. 1973). However, the courts generally refer
to the percentage of minority persons in the relevant population, probably because in
most cases the population percentage approximates the work force percentage and because calculation of the work force percentage may be difficult. See United States v.
Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l U., Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412, n.7, 5 F.E.P.
318, 320, n.7 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the
Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341, 5 F.E.P. 1344, 1350 (2d Cir.
1973) (using percentage of minority policemen in neighboring towns as a referent);
Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New York,
F.2d -, -, 6 F.E.P. 1045, 1053, 6 E.P.D. f 8974 at 6141 (2d Cir. 1973) (setting
percentage figure between current minority representation in fire department and population percentage).
112. Similarly, the courts have not interfered with promises for employment made
to white applicants. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ballard, F. Supp. -, -,
6 F.E.P. 287,
289 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (eight white workers who had received notice of employment
were given the opportunity to accept their jobs).
113. United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 376-77, 5 F.E.P. 823, 841
(8th Cir. 1973). In Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960, 970, 5 F.E.P. 934, 939 (5th
Cir. 1973), afi'd and remanded, 491 F.2d 1053, 7 F.E.P. 586 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), Judge Goldberg referred to preferential orders as "transitional protective measures."
114. See, e.g., United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. (I), 325 F. Supp. 478,
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(iii) As noted above, the courts are wary of providing relief to
the undeserving. Hence, even though the actual victims of discrimination often cannot be named, the courts try to narrow the class of

persons within the minority group from which the victims must have
come. 115 Of course, if certain individual discriminatees can actually
be named, they are given priority. 116
(iv) The courts are also reluctant to interfere unnecessarily with
the operation of the respondent's business. They do not saddle an
employer with unqualified workers. Preferential decrees are usually
directed at entry-level or trainee positions rather -than at more respon-

sible job levels.' 17 When possible, nondiscriminatory standards being
used by the respondent are not disturbed, even though they may not
be clearly job-related. In Carter v. Gallagher,"" for example, resi-

dency requirements and veterans' preferences for firemen were left
intact.

Likewise, discriminatory standards are frequently modified

rather than eliminated to make them job-related. 119

And some courts

3 F.E.P. 354 (W.D.N.C. 1970); Harper v. Kloster (I), - F. Supp. -, 5 F.E.P. 1049
(D. Md. 1973). The final Vogler decree appears to be the only order with no time
limit. Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., -

F. Supp. -,

-,

2 F.E.P. 491, 493 (E.D. La. 1970).

115. In United States v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 360 F. Supp. 979, 6 F.E.P. 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), the union historically had considered only black applicants under the
age of 25. The court ordered the union to consider black applicants between 25 and
30 as well in meeting its percentage requirement, presumably because those blacks were
likely to be among the group victimized by the union's past practices.
116.

See, e.g., Strain v. Philpott, -

F. Supp. -,

-,

4 F.E.P. 822, 823 (M.D. Ala.

1971). Except in those circumstances, though, the respondent is given a free hand in
selecting which minority workers it will hire.
117. There are other reasons for the infrequency with which preferential promotion
orders are entered. Minority preferences may interfere with the promotions of whites
and thereby "exacerbate rather than diminish" the intensity of racial attitudes. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1341, 5 F.E.P. 1344, 1350 (2d Cir. 1973). Further, the classic violation in the promotion context stems from a seniority or transfer provision in a collective bargaining
agreement which locks minorities into inferior positions. For instance, in the trucking
industry minority workers who have been hired into low paying city-driver jobs are often prevented from transferring to more lucrative over-the-road jobs by contract clauses
which either disallow transfers altogether or only allow a city driver to transfer if he
relinquishes his seniority. See, e.g., Jones v. Leeway Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245
(10th Cir. 1970). Since the promotion process is mechanical, the discrimination can
be eliminated simply by readjusting the mechanics, i.e., by eliminating the discriminatory provision. See United States v.-Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971). Hence, preferential relief is generally unnecessary. Where promotion decisions
are made on the basis of discretion rather than as provided for in a collective bargaining agreement, there may be no mechanism by which the courts can assure that the
process is free from discrimination. Thus, preferential relief may not be in order. See
United States v. N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354, 367, 5 F.E.P. 823, 833 (8th Cir. 1973)
(preferential relief for "frontline foreman" positions which had been filled on the basis
of supervisor's recommendations, but not for "working foremen" who had been chosen
on the basis of seniority); United States v. United States Steel Corp., - F. Supp. -,
-, 5 F.E.P. 1253, 1259 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (promotions to management training and
apprenticeship program made on a discretionary basis; preferential relief therefore ordered).
118. 452 F.2d 315, 4 F.E.P. 121 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
119. See, e.g., Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 5 F.E.P.
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have allowed respondents to continue to apply their original discriminatory standards to white applicants while ordering new standards for
non-whites. 2 '
(v) Some preferential orders require the respondent to make only
a good faith effort to meet the percentage standards, not to hire minority persons at all costs. If a respondent fails to meet the standard,
he is still given an opportunity to demonstrate that he could not do
12 1
so because sufficient qualified minority persons were not available.
CONCLUSION

The problem of government-imposed racial preferences in any area
is a sticky one. Disagreement has been the sharpest in the area of
employment-both because the notion of a preference runs counter
to our idea of a meritocracy and because jobs are so important to all
workers, black and white. In resolving the conflicting arguments on
preferential relief the courts have taken a middle path. They have
developed justifications for their preferential orders, but they have
narrowed those orders so as to minimize objections to the ordered preferences. They have neither directly nor completely addressed the
question of the legality of the preferences.
In the future, the courts are likely to continue along the middle path,
perhaps hoping that the employment discrimination problem is only
temporary. As employers come to understand more about their obligations under the fair employment laws, the instances of severe violations which have thus far triggered preferential orders may diminish.
Further, if preferential orders do succeed in leading toward a colorblind society, there will be no future need for preferential orders. The
wisdom of the courts' approach will be best proven if their orders do
indeed help lead us to a color-blind society.
229 (7th Cir. 1972) (experience requirement modified). In civil service cases requirements may be relaxed to the extent that minority applicants are taken from a list of
eligibles within the civil service list rather than only from the top. Harper v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore (I), - F. Supp. -,
5 F.E.P. 1049 (D. Md. 1973);
Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, - F. Supp. -,
6 F.E.P. 1270,
6 E.P.D. 8959 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
120. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 737, 4 F.E.P. 700, 709 (1st Cir. 1972).
In United States v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 360 F. Supp. 979, 6 F.E.P. 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), however, the union was ordered to restructure and expand its entire referral procedure.
121. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 778, 797, 5 F.E.P. 570, 584 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 482 F.2d 1333, 5
F.E.P. 1344 (2d Cir. 1973); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist.,
325 F. Supp. 560, 3 F.E.P. 418 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd in part, 461 F.2d 276, 4

F.E.P. 864, 867 (5th Cir. 1972).
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